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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
------------------------------------------------------- X
MARY JO C.,
OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff, 09 CV 5635 (SJF)(ARL)
- against-
NEW YORK STATE AND LOCAL 
RETIREMENT SYSTEM and 
CENTRAL ISLIP PUBLIC LIBRARY,
Defendants.
------------------------------------------------------- X
FEUERSTEIN, J.
On December 23, 2009, plaintiff Mary Jo C. (“plaintiff’) commenced this action pursuant 
to Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12131, et seq., and New 
York Executive Law § 296 (“state law”) against defendants New York State and Local 
Retirement System (“the State defendant”) and the Central Islip Public Library (“the Library”) 
(collectively, “defendants”), alleging: (1) that the State defendant denied her a reasonable 
accommodation for her mental disability in violation of Title II of the ADA by failing to waive 
the requirements for applying for disability retirement benefits under Section 605 of the New 
York State Retirement and Social Security Law (“NYRSSL”); and (2) that the Library denied her 
a reasonable accommodation for her mental disability in violation of both Title II of the ADA 
and state law by failing (a) to file an application for disability retirement benefits on her behalf as 
permitted by Section 605(a)(2) of the NYRSSL and (b) to reclassify the termination of her 
employment as a leave of absence. The State defendant moves pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) and 
(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to dismiss the complaint against it for lack of subject 
matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim, respectively; and the Library moves pursuant to
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Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Procedure to dismiss the complaint against it for failure to 
state a claim. For the reasons discussed herein, defendants’ motions are granted in part and 
denied in part.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Factual Allegations1
Plaintiff is a fifty-eight (58) year old woman who has suffered from an unidentified 
mental illness since adolescence. (Complaint [Compl.], fflf 1, 12). Between 1986 and November 
2006, plaintiff intermittently worked as a librarian for various libraries on Long Island, including 
the Library. (Compl., ^ 13). In 1988, plaintiff became a member of the State defendant.
(Compl., f  14). Plaintiff alleges that in or about November 12, 2006, the Library terminated her 
employment “as a result of behaviors that were symptomatic of her mental illness.” (Compl., 
16-17). According to plaintiff, “[a]s a result of behviors manifested by [her] that were 
symptomatic of her mental illness, libraries in Suffolk County communicated among themselves 
and agreed that [she] should not be hired as a librarian. In vernacular, [plaintiff] has been 
blackballed from working in the public library system in Suffolk County.” (Compl., ]f 40).
Plaintiff alleges that she would have been eligible for disability retirement benefits from 
the State defendant under Section 605 of the NYRSSL as a result of her mental illness if she had 
made a timely application for such benefits, i.e., within three (3) months from her last day of 
work. (Compl., 18, 19). According to plaintiff, her mental illness prevented her from
1 The factual allegations are taken from the complaint and, although disputed by defendants, are 
presumed to be true for purposes of this motion only. They do not constitute findings of fact by 
the court.
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“recognizing] that state law required her to file her retirement benefits application within three 
(3) months of her last day of employment.” (Compl., ^ 20). Nonetheless, plaintiff alleges that 
during the intervening three (3) month period, her brother “attempted to take steps to assist [her] 
in obtaining benefits to which she was entitled,” including speaking to the State defendant’s 
disability retirement director, Theresa Shumway (“Shumway”). (Compl., Tfl[ 21, 22). According 
to plaintiff, Shumway informed her brother that the Library could file an application for disability 
retirement benefits on her behalf. (Compl., If 23).
Plaintiff alleges that on or about February 11, 2007, her brother requested that the Library 
file for retirement benefits on her behalf. (Compl., f  25). According to plaintiff, the Library 
denied her brother’s request on or about February 12, 2007. (Compl., ^ 26).
Plaintiff alleges that on or about February 13, 2007, her brother requested that the Library 
reclassify her termination as an unpaid leave of absence, but the Library also denied that request. 
(Compl., H  27,29).
Plaintiff alleges that she applied for disability retirement benefits in November 2007, 
when her clinical condition had improved. (Compl., f  30). According to plaintiff, the State 
defendant denied her application based upon her failure to comply with the three (3) month filing 
deadline prescribed by Section 605(b)(2) of the NYRSSL. (Compl, 1 31).
Plaintiff alleges that on or about July 23, 2008, she “requested an accommodation under 
the [ADA] from [the State defendant] in the form of a waiver of the filing deadline.” (Compl., f  
32). According to plaintiff, the State defendant “never formally responded” to that request. 
(Compl., ]f 33). Meanwhile, plaintiff appealed the State defendant’s denial of her application for 
disability retirement benefits, which was affirmed by the hearing officer. (Compl., 35, 37).
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B. Procedural History
On December 23, 2009, plaintiff commenced this action against defendants alleging: (1) 
that by failing to waive the requirements for filing of disability retirement benefits under Section 
605 of the NYRSSL, the State defendant denied her a reasonable accommodation for her mental 
disability in violation of Title II of the ADA (first cause of action), (Compl., H 44); and (2) that 
by failing (a) to file a disability retirement application on her behalf as permitted by Section 
605(a)(2) of the NYRSSL and (b) to reclassify her termination as a leave of absence, the Library 
denied her a reasonable accommodation for her mental disability in violation of both Title II of 
the ADA and state law (second through fifth causes of action), (Compl., 46-52). Plaintiff
seeks: (a) judgment declaring that defendants violated Title II of the ADA and that the Library 
also violated state law; (b) (i) an injunction directing the State defendant to waive the three (3) 
month filing period under Section 605(b)(2) of the NYRSSL or, (ii) in the alternative, 
compensatory damages against the Library; and (c) attorney’s fees and costs pursuant to 42 
U.S.C. § 12205. (Compl., “Wherefore” Clause).
The State defendant moves pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) and (6) of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure to dismiss the complaint against it for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and 
failure to state a claim, respectively; and the Library moves pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the 
Federal Rules of Procedure to dismiss the complaint against it for failure to state a claim.
H. ANALYSIS
A. Rule 12(b)(1)2
2 Since a federal court generally may not rule on the merits of a case without first determining 
that it has jurisdiction, see Sinochem International Co. Ltd, v. Malaysia International Shipping
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1. Standard of Review
Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, see Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah 
Services. Inc.. 545 U.S. 546, 552, 125 S.Ct. 2611, 162 L.Ed.2d 502 (2005); Frontera Resources 
Azerbaijan Corp. v. State Oil Co. of Azerbaijan Republic. 582 F.3d 393, 397 (2d Cir. 2009), and 
may not preside over cases absent subject matter jurisdiction. See Exxon Mobil. 545 U.S. at 552, 
125 S.Ct. 2611 (holding that federal courts may not exercise jurisdiction absent a statutory basis); 
County of Nassau. N.Y. v. Hotels.com. LP. 577 F.3d 89, 91 (2d Cir. 2009) (holding that federal 
courts lack power to disregard the limits on their jurisdiction imposed by the Constitution or 
Congress). Lack of subject matter jurisdiction cannot be waived and may be raised at any time 
by a party or by the court sua sponte. See Oscar Gruss & Son. Inc, v. Hollander. 337 F.3d 186, 
193 (2d Cir. 2003); Lvndonville Sav. Bank & Trust Co. v. Lussier. 211 F.3d 697, 700 (2d Cir. 
20001: see also Henderson ex rel. Henderson v. Shinseki. 131 S.Ct. 1197, 1202 (Mar. 1,2011) 
(“[Fjederal courts have an independent obligation to ensure that they do not exceed the scope of 
their jurisdiction, and therefore they must raise and decide jurisdictional questions that the parties 
either overlook or elect not to press. * * * Objections to subject matter jurisdiction * * * may be 
raised at any time.”); Union Pacific R. Co. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers and 
Trainmen General Committee of Adjustment. Cent. Region. 130 S.Ct. 584, 596,175 L.Ed.2d428 
(2009) (“[sjubject-matter jurisdiction, * * * refers to a tribunal’s power to hear a case, a matter 
that can never be forfeited or waived.” (internal quotations and citations omitted)). If a court 
lacks subject matter jurisdiction, it must dismiss the action. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3); Arbaueh v.
Corp.. 549 U.S. 422,431,127 S.Ct. 1184,167 L.Ed.2d 15 (2007), I must necessarily decide the 
branch of the State defendant’s motion seeking dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) prior to 
rendering any determination on the branch of its motion seeking dismissal pursuant to Rule 
12(b)(6), which requires a decision on the merits of the case.
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Y&HCoip., 546 U.S. 500, 514, 126 S.Ct. 1235, 163 L.Ed.2d 1097 (2006); Durant. Nichols. 
Houston, Hodgson & Cortese-Costa. P.C. v. Dupont. 565 F.3d 56, 62-3 (2d Cir. 2009). The 
plaintiff has the burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that subject matter 
jurisdiction exists. Hamm v. U.S.. 483 F.3d 135, 137 (2d Cir. 2007); Makarova v. United States. 
201 F.3d 110,113 (2d Cir. 2000).
2. Standing
The State defendant contends that plaintiff lacks constitutional standing to assert her 
ADA claim against it.
“Standing is a federal jurisdictional question ‘determining the power of the court to 
entertain the suit.’” Carver v. City of New York. 621 F.3d 221, 225 (2d Cir. 2010) (citing Warth 
v. Seldin. 422 U.S. 490, 498, 95 S.Ct. 2197,45 L.Ed.2d 343 [1975]). Constitutional standing 
determines “‘whether the plaintiff has made out a “case or controversy” between himself and the 
defendant within the meaning of Article III,’ and is therefore ‘entitled to have the court decide
the merits of the dispute or of particular issues.”’ Amnesty Intern. USA v. Clapper.___F.3d___ ,
2011 WL 941524, at * 9 (2d Cir. Mar. 21, 2011) (quoting Warth. 422 U.S. at 498, 95 S.Ct.
2197). “[A] plaintiff must demonstrate standing for each claim and form of relief sought.”
Cacchillo v. Insmed. Inc..___F.3d___ , 2011 WL 1005427, at * 2 (2d Cir. Mar. 23, 2011)
(quoting Baur v. Veneman. 352 F.3d 625, 642 n. 15 (2d Cir. 2003)). To meet the constitutional 
requirement of standing, a plaintiff must allege (1) an injury-in-fact, i.e., “an invasion of a legally 
protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized . . .  and (b) actual or imminent, not 
conjectural or hypothetical,” Carver. 621 F.3d at 225; (2) a “causal connection between the injury
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and the conduct complained of,” Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife 504 U.S. 555, 560-561, 112 
S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992); and (3) a likelihood that the injury alleged “will be 
redressed by a favorable decision,” Id.; see also Arizona Christian School Tuition Organization v 
Winn, 131 S.Ct. 1436, 1442 (Apr. 4, 2011); Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms. 130 S.Ct. 
2743, 2752, 177 L.Ed.2d 461 (2010) (holding that in order to establish Article III standing, a 
plaintiff must allege an “injury [that is] concrete, particularized, and actual or imminent; fairly 
traceable to the challenged action; and redressable by a favorable ruling.”) If a plaintiff lacks 
constitutional standing, the court has no subject matter jurisdiction to hear the claim. Central 
States Southeast and Southwest Areas Health and Welfare Fund v. Merck-Medm Managed Care. 
L.L.C., 433 F.3d 181, 198 (2d Cir. 2005). “The party invoking federal jurisdiction bears the 
burden of establishing the[] elements [of standing].” Luian. 504 U.S. at 561, 112 S.Ct. 2130; see 
also Summers v. Earth Island Inst.. 555 U.S. 488, 129 S.Ct. 1142, 1149, 173 L.Ed.2d 1 (2009) 
(holding that the plaintiff “bears the burden of showing that he has standing for each type of 
relief sought.”)
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a. Injury-in-Fact
The State defendant contends that plaintiff has no “legally protected interest” in receiving 
disability retirement benefits under state law because she failed to comply with a condition 
precedent for receiving such benefits, i.e., filing her application within the statutory time period.
The “critical question” in determining whether the plaintiff has alleged an “injury-in-fact” 
“is whether ‘the plaintiff has alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as 
to warrant his invocation of federal-court jurisdiction.” Amnesty Intern..___F.3d___ , 2011 WL
7
941524, at * 9 (emphasis in original) (quoting Summers. 555 U.S. 488, 129 S.Ct. 1142, 1149). A 
legally protected interest ‘may exist solely by virtue of statutes creating legal rights, the invasion 
of which creates standing.’” Fulton v. Goord. 591 F.3d 37, 41 (2d Cir. 2009) (quoting Warth. 422 
U.S. at 500, 95 S.Ct. 2197). “Accordingly, ‘standing is gauged by the specific common-law, 
statutory or constitutional claims that a party presents.’” Id. (quoting International Primatp 
Protection League v. Administrators of Tulane Educational Fund. 500 U.S. 72, 77, 111 S.Ct.
1700, 114 L.Ed.2d 134(1991)).
Plaintiffs claim against the State defendant alleges a violation of Title II of the ADA, 
which provides, in relevant part, that “no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of 
such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, 
programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.”
42 U.S.C. § 12132. The ADA “provides ‘remedies, procedures, and rights . . .  to any person 
alleging discrimination on the basis of disability in violation of section 12132’* * *,” Fulton. 592 
F.3d at 42 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12133), and confers standing upon individuals to enforce the 
right to be free from disability-based discrimination by public entities. Id. Accordingly, 
plaintiffs allegation that she was “discriminatorily denied a reasonable accommodation for her 
disability in violation of her rights under [Title II of the ADA],” is sufficient to allege an “injury- 
in-fact” for Article III standing purposes. See, e.g. id.
The State defendant misconstrues plaintiffs claim against it. Although the State 
defendant may be correct that plaintiff has no legally protected interest in receiving disability 
retirement benefits under Section 605 of the NYRSSL, the legally protected interest implicated 
by plaintiffs claim against the State defendant is her right to be free from disability-based
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discrimination with respect to her participation in, or receipt of benefits from, the State 
defendant’s disability retirement program. The State defendant does not explain why a violation 
of that right, i.e., by failing to provide plaintiff with her requested accommodation of a waiver of 
the statutory filing deadline, as distinct from any right to receive disability retirement benefits 
under state law, does not create an injury-in-fact. See, e^ g. Fulton. 591 F.3d at 42 (finding that 
whatever the merit of the defendants’ argument that the plaintiff had no “legally cognizable 
interest in having her incarcerated spouse transferred” to a different prison facility, the plaintiff 
had standing to pursue her ADA claim that the defendants’ refusal to accommodate her disability 
by transferring her spouse in order to allow her to participate in the visiting program deprived her 
of her right to be free from disability-based discrimination). Accordingly, contrary to the State 
defendant’s contention, plaintiff meets the “injury-in-fact” requirement of constitutional 
standing.
Case 2:09-cv-05635-SJF-ARL Document 33 Filed 05/05/11 Page 9 of 26 PagelD #:
<pageID>
b. Causation
The State defendant contends that plaintiff has not demonstrated a causal connection 
between her inability to obtain disability retirement benefits and its conduct because: (1) her 
inability to obtain benefits was caused solely by her own nonperformance, i.e., her failure to 
timely file an application for such benefits; and (2) its denial of her application was not 
discretionary.
Generally, “causation is shown if the defendants’ actions had a ‘determinative or coercive 
effect’ on the action that produced the injury.” Carver. 621 F.3d at 226 (quoting Bennett v.
Spear. 520 U.S. 154, 169, 117 S.Ct. 1154, 137 L.Ed.2d 281 (1997)). Although “[t]he causal
9
chain can be broken where a plaintiff5s self-inflicted injury results from his unreasonable 
decision to bring about a harm that he knew to be avoidable, * * * standing is not defeated 
merely because the plaintiff has in some sense contributed to his own injury. Standing is 
defeated only if it is concluded that the injury is so completely due to the plaintiffs own fault as
to break the causal chain.” Amnesty International.___F.3d___ , 2011 WL 941524, at * 11
(internal quotations, alterations and citations omitted).
Again, the State defendant’s contention misconstrues plaintiffs claim against it.
Plaintiffs claim is that the State defendant refused to provide her with a reasonable 
accommodation in the form of a waiver of the statutory filing requirements for disability 
retirement benefits, thereby depriving her of her right to be free from disability-based 
discrimination. Thus, plaintiff has alleged a causal connection between the State defendant’s 
conduct, i.e., its refusal to waive the statutory filing requirements, and her injury, i.e., her right to 
be free from disability-based discrimination with respect to her participation in, or receipt of 
benefits from, the State defendant’s disability retirement program.
c. Redressability
The State defendant contends that plaintiffs alleged injury cannot be redressed by a 
favorable decision from this Court because this Court is without authority to grant the injunctive 
relief requested by plaintiff requiring it to waive a filing requirement mandated by state law.
“To demonstrate redressability, a plaintiff must show the substantial likelihood that the
requested relief will remedy the alleged injury in fact.” Amnesty International, ___F.3d___ ,
2011 WL 941524, at * 16 n. 24 (internal quotations and citations omitted). However, “where
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legal rights have been invaded, and a federal statute provides for a general right to sue for such 
invasion, federal courts may use any available remedy to make good the wrong done.” Barnes v. 
Gorman. 536 U.S. 181, 189, 122 S.Ct. 2097, 153 L.Ed.2d 230 (2002) (quoting Bell v. Hood, 327 
U.S. 678, 684-85, 66 S.Ct. 773, 90 L.Ed. 939 (1946)); see also Franklin v. Gwinnett County 
Public Schools. 503 U.S. 60, 70-1,112 S.Ct. 1028,117 L.Ed.2d 208 (1992) (holding that 
generally, “federal courts have the power to award any appropriate relief in a cognizable cause of 
action brought pursuant to a federal statute.”) The question of whether judicial relief is available 
for a particular cause of action is a merits determination. See Davis v. Passman. 442 U.S. 228, 
245, 99 S.Ct. 2264, 60 L.Ed.2d 846 (1979).
Since Title II of the ADA provides for a general right to sue for, inter alia, a failure to 
make reasonable accommodation, for which this Court may fashion any appropriate remedy, the 
issue of whether judicial relief is available to remedy the alleged discrimination by the State 
defendant is not appropriately addressed on a Rule 12(b)(1) motion on the pleadings. 
Accordingly, the branch of the State defendant’s motion seeking dismissal of plaintiffs claim 
against it for lack of constitutional standing is denied. 3
3. Sovereign Immunity
The Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution bars suits in federal court by 
private parties against a state or one of its agencies, absent consent to suit or an express statutory 
waiver of immunity. Board of Trustees of University of Alabama v. Garrett. 531 U.S. 356, 362, 
121 S. Ct. 955, 148 L. Ed. 2d 866 (2001); Edelman v, Jordan. 415 U.S. 651, 94 S.Ct. 1347, 39 
L.Ed.2d 662 (1974). Although the Eleventh Amendment generally does not bar suits against
Case 2:09-cv-05635-SJF-ARL Document 33 Filed 05/05/11 Page 11 of 26 PagelD #:
^  • <pageID>
11
state officials seeking prospective relief, see Ex parte Young. 209 U.S. 123, 28 S.Ct. 441, 52 
L.Ed.2d 714 (1908); Conyers v. Rossides. 558 F.3d 137, 150 (2d Cir. 2009), that exception to 
Eleventh Amendment immunity is inapplicable to suits against the States and their agencies, 
which are barred regardless of the relief sought. Puerto Rico Aqueduct and Sewer Authority v. 
Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139,146,113 S.Ct. 684, 121 L.Ed.2d 605 (1993); see also Wans 
v. Office of Professional Medical Conduct. New York. 354 Fed. Appx. 459, 461 (2d Cir. Nov.
13,2009) (holding that under the doctrine of Ex Parte Young, the plaintiff may only seek 
prospective relief from the state by naming a state official, rather than the State or state agency 
directly); In re Deposit Ins. Agency. 482 F.3d 612, 618 (2d Cir. 2007) (accord).
Although a State may choose to waive its Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity, its 
consent to suit “must be ‘unequivocally expressed’ in the text of the relevant statute” and may 
not be implied. Sossamon v. Texas 131 S.Ct. 1651,1658 (Apr. 20, 2011). Moreover, Section 
Five of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution authorizes Congress to 
abrogate states’ sovereign immunity in order “to enforce the substantive rights guaranteed by the 
Fourteenth Amendment.” Bolmer v. Oliveira. 594 F.3d 134, 146 (2d Cir. 2010) (citation 
omittedV. see also United States v. Georgia. 546 U.S. 151,154,158-59,126 S.Ct. 877,163 
L.Ed.2d 650 (2006). Pursuant to such authority, “Congress has unambiguously purported to 
abrogate states’ immunity from Title II [ADA] claims.” Bolmer, 594 F.3d at 146 (citing 42 
U.S.C. § 12202k see also Georgia. 546 U.S. at 154, 158-59, 126 S.Ct. 877. Accordingly, the 
Supreme Court has held that “insofar as Title II creates a private cause of action for damages 
against the States for conduct that actually violates the Fourteenth Amendment, Title II validly 
abrogates state sovereign immunity.” Georgia. 546 U.S. at 159, 126 S.Ct. 877 (emphasis in
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original). The Supreme Court, thus, established the following three (3)-step analysis for courts to 
use “in the first instance, on a claim-by-claim basis” to determine whether there has been a valid 
abrogation of sovereign immunity, thereby allowing a Title II ADA claim against a state 
defendant to proceed: (1) the court must first identify “which aspects of the State’s alleged 
conduct violated Title II” of the ADA; (2) if a violation of Title II of the ADA is found, the court 
must next determine “to what extent such misconduct also violated the Fourteenth Amendment;” 
and (3) finally, if the alleged misconduct violated Title II of the ADA but not the Fourteenth 
Amendment, the court must then determine “whether Congress’s purported abrogation of 
sovereign immunity as to that class of conduct is nevertheless valid.”3 Georgia. 546 U.S. at 158­
59, 126 S.Ct. 877.
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a. Title II Violation
To state a claim under Title II of the ADA, a plaintiff must allege: (1) that he or she is a 
“qualified individual with a disability” and (2) that he or she was excluded from participation in, 
or benefitting from, a public entity’s services, programs or activities, or was otherwise 
discriminated against by that entity, (3) by reason of his or her disability. See Natarelli v. VESID 
Office. No. 10-77-CV, 2011 WL 1486085, at * 1 (2d Cir. Apr. 20, 2011); Henrietta D. v. 
Bloomberg. 331 F.3d 261, 272 (2d Cir. 2003).
i. Qualified Individual with a Disability
3 Plaintiff concedes that the State defendant’s failure to provide her with her requested 
accommodation does not violate the Fourteenth Amendment. (Plaintiffs Memorandum of Law 
in Opposition to Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss [Plf. Mem.], p. 10).
13
A. “Disability”
The ADA defines “disability” as “(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially 
limits one or more major life activities of such individual; (B) a record of such an impairment; or 
(C) being regarded as having such an impairment * * 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1).4 The ADA
further defines “major life activities” to include “caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, 
seeing, hearing, eating, sleeping, walking, standing, lifting, bending, speaking, breathing, 
learning, reading, concentrating, thinking, communicating, and working.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2).
The complaint does not sufficiently allege that plaintiff has a “disability” within the 
meaning of the ADA. Although plaintiff alleges that she has suffered from an unidentified 
mental illness since adolescence, she does not allege any additional facts plausibly suggesting 
that such mental illness substantially limited one or more of her major life activities.
Accordingly, plaintiffs complaint does not state a cognizable claim under Title II of the ADA.
See, e.g. Tvlicki v. St. Onge. 297 Fed. Appx. 65, 67 (2d Cir. Oct. 28, 2008) (finding that the 
plaintiffs complaint did not adequately plead a disability under Title II of the ADA where it 
contained no allegations describing how his supposed mental condition substantially limited a 
major life activity). Since the complaint does not state a plausible Title II ADA claim against the 
State defendant, there was no abrogation of the State defendant’s sovereign immunity with 
respect to plaintiffs claim against the State defendant. See, e.g. Natarelli, 2011 WL 1486085, at 
* 2 (finding that the district court correctly determined at the first step of the Georgia analysis 
that the state conduct at issue did not violate Title II).
Case 2:09-cv-05635-SJF-ARL Document 33 Filed 05/05/11 Page 14 of 26 PagelD #:
: ^  <pageID>
4 Only the first definition is relevant in this case.
14
B. “Qualified Individual”
Title II of the ADA defines “qualified individual with a disability” to mean “an individual 
with a disability who, with or without reasonable modifications to rules, policies, or practices, *
* *, meets the essential eligibility requirements for the receipt of services or the participation in 
programs or activities provided by a public entity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12131(2). The ADA’s “use of 
the term ‘qualified’ suggests that [courts] must look not to the administration of the program for 
which the plaintiff is qualified, but rather its formal legal eligibility requirements.” Henrietta D.. 
331 F.3dat277 (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131-321: see also Powell v. National Board of Medical 
Examiners. 364 F.3d 79, 87 (2d Cir. 2004) (finding that the plaintiff failed to demonstrate that 
she was a “qualified individual” within the meaning of the ADA where the facts suggested that 
she did not meet the essential eligibility requirements for participation in the defendant’s 
program). “When reviewing a challenge to the eligibility requirements of a program, a court 
must first review each eligibility requirement to determine whether or not the requirement is 
essential- which entails determining whether an accommodation is reasonable- and then must 
determine whether the individual has met those requirements that are essential.” Castellano v. 
City of New York. 946 F.Supp. 249, 254 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), affd on other grounds. 142 F.3d 58 
(2d Cir. 1998).
“An eligibility requirement will be essential- or an accommodation of it will be 
unreasonable- if its alteration either imposes undue financial and administrative burdens on the 
public entity or requires a fundamental alteration in the nature of the program.” Castellano. 946 
F.Supp. at 254 (internal quotations, alterations and citations omitted); see also 28 C.F.R. § 
35.130(b)(7) (“A public entity shall make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or
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procedures when * * * necessary to avoid discrimination on the basis of disability, unless [it] can 
demonstrate that making the modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of the service, 
program or activity.”); 28 C.F.R. § 41.53 (“A [public entity] shall make reasonable 
accommodation to the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified 
handicapped applicant or employee unless [it] can demonstrate that the accommodation would 
impose an undue hardship on the operation of its program.”)
Section 605 of the NYRSSL, pursuant to which plaintiff filed her application for 
disability retirement benefits, provides, in relevant part, that “[a]t the time of the filing of an 
application * * *, the member must: 1. Have at least ten years of total service credit, and 2. The 
application must be filed * * * (b) within three months from the last date the member was being 
paid on the payroll * * *.” N.Y. Ret. and Soc. Sec. Law § 605(b). New York courts have 
interpreted a similar requirement in Section 62 of the NYRSSL to constitute “a condition 
precedent to the ripening of any rights” or entitlement to disability benefits, see Banks v. New 
York State and Local Employees’ Retirement System. 294 A.D.2d 164, 165, 741 N.Y.S.2d 413 
(1st Dept. 2002) (quoting Matter of Grossman v, McCall. 262 A.D.2d 923, 924, 692 N.Y.S.2d 
775 (3d Dept. 1999)); Matter of Callace v. New York State Employees’ Retirement System. 140 
A.D.2d 756, 757, 528 N.Y.S.2d 175 (3d Dept. 1988) (holding that the statutory ninety (90)-day 
requirement “is a condition precedent to the existence of a substantive right to ordinary disability 
retirement”), and have specifically rejected the contention that the statutory filing period may be 
extended or waived by the State agency, even where the applicant claims that the disability 
giving rise to his or her claim for disability benefits also rendered him incapable of asserting his 
or her claim in a timely manner, see Grossman. 262 A.D.2d at 924; Callace, 140 A.D.2d at 757-
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58. According to those New York courts, the State Legislature added the statutory filing 
requirement “to alleviate hardships created when members of the [State] Retirement System 
mistakenly terminate their service prior to filing for benefits,” Grossman. 262 A.D.2d at 924, 
and, thus, any remedy of the burden imposed by the statutory time period “must lie with the 
Legislature.” Id.; see also Callace. 140 A.D.2d at 758.
The cases upon which plaintiff relies for the proposition that “the duty to provide a 
reasonable accommodation under the ADA sometimes entails an obligation to act in 
contravention of a state statute,” (Plf. Mem., p. 13), are inapposite. None of those cases involved 
a determination of whether the plaintiff met the essential eligibility requirements for participation 
in a particular program or service or whether waiver of an essential eligibility requirement for the 
receipt of services or benefits constituted a “reasonable accommodation” under the ADA, and all 
of those cases involved some exercise of discretion by the defendant. See McGarv v. City of 
Portland. 386 F.3d 1259 (9th Cir. 2004) (involving the defendants’ enforcement of a local 
nuisance ordinance against the plaintiff); Regional Economic Community Action Program. Inc, 
v. City of Middletown ('“RECAP”). 294 F.3d 35, 53 (2d Cir. 2002) (involving a refusal by the 
defendants to grant the plaintiffs a special use permit); Oxford House. Inc, v. Town of Babylon, 
819 F.Supp. 1179, 1185 (E.D.N.Y. 1993) (involving the application of a local zoning ordinance 
to evict the plaintiffs); Tsombanidis v. City of West Haven. 180 F.Supp.2d 262, 292-93 (D.
Conn. 2001), aff d in part and rev’d in part. 352 F.3d 565 (2d Cir. 2003) (involving enforcement 
of local zoning and land use ordinances against the plaintiffs); Oxford House, Inc, v. Township 
of Cherry Hill, 799 F.Supp. 450, 463 (D. N.J. 1992) (same). To the contrary, this case does not 
involve the exercise of any discretion on the part of the State defendant. Rather, state law, as
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interpreted by the state courts, specifically precludes the State defendant from exercising any 
discretion to extend or waive the statutory filing period for the application of disability retirement 
benefits.
Thus, plaintiff s requested accommodation from the State defendant does not merely seek 
a reasonable modification of the State defendant’s own rules, policies or practices over which it 
has discretion. Rather, plaintiff seeks a waiver of an essential eligibility requirement for receipt 
of disability benefits under NYRSSL § 605, which the State courts have determined the State 
defendant is without authority to grant. Requiring the State defendant to violate state law is not a 
reasonable accommodation as a matter of law. See, e.g. Herschaft v. New York Board of 
Elections. No. 00 CV 2748, 2001 WL 940923, at * 6 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 13, 2001), affd on other 
grounds. 37 Fed. Appx. 17 (2d Cir. 2002) (finding that the plaintiffs requested accommodation 
of a two to three week extension of the six (6)-week time period within which to gather 
signatures for an independent nominating petition pursuant to New York Election Law § 6- 
138(4), which the Board of Elections had no statutory authority to waive, was “unreasonable 
simply because it would require the Board of Elections to violate a state statute * * *.”); Aughe 
v. Shalala. 885 F.Supp. 1428, 1431-33 (W.D. Wash. 1995) (distinguishing cases requesting 
modification of a defendant’s internal eligibility rules or policies from cases seeking waiver of a 
statutory requirement of which the defendant did not have authority to waive and finding that 
since the plaintiffs requested accommodation of a statutory age requirement “would essentially 
rewrite the statute, it must be seen as a fundamental alteration in the nature of the program * * * 
[and] could impose an undue financial burden on the program.”). As held by Judge Amon in 
Herschaft. “an accommodation that would require a defendant to violate an otherwise
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constitutional state law is inherently unreasonable.”5 2001 WL 940923, at * 6.
Since plaintiff did not file her application for disability retirement benefits within three 
(3) months from the last date she “was being paid on the payroll,” N.Y. Ret. Soc. Sec. Law § 
605(b)(2)(b), she did not meet “the essential eligibility requirements for the receipt o f’ disability 
retirement benefits under NYRSSL § 605. Accordingly, plaintiff is not a “qualified individual 
with a disability” within the meaning of Title II of the ADA. Since plaintiff cannot state a 
cognizable Title II ADA claim against the State defendant, there was no valid abrogation of the 
State defendant’s sovereign immunity from this suit. Therefore, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1), the 
complaint is dismissed with prejudice as against the State defendant as barred by the doctrine of 
sovereign immunity.6
B. Rule 12(b)(6)
1. Standard of Review
The standard of review on a motion made pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure is that a plaintiff plead sufficient facts “to state a claim for relief that is 
plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twomblv. 550 U.S. 544,127 S.Ct. 1955,1974,167 
L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). The pleading of specific facts is not required; rather a complaint need only 
give the defendant “fair notice of what the * * * claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.”
5 Plaintiff does not challenge the constitutionality of NYRSSL § 605.
6 To the extent that plaintiff seeks leave to amend her complaint to assert a claim seeking 
prospective injunctive relief against the Comptroller, in his official capacity as head of the State 
defendant, in order to avoid the Eleventh Amendment’s bar to suit under the doctrine set forth in 
Ex Parte Young, her request is denied because any such amendment would be futile. Since, as a 
matter of law, plaintiff is not a “qualified individual with a disability,” she cannot state a valid 
Title II ADA claim against the State defendant or its officials, including the Comptroller.
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Erickson v. Pardus. 551 U.S. 89,127 S.Ct. 2197, 2200, 167 L.Ed.2d 1081 (2007); see also Arista 
Records. LLC v. Doe 3. 604 F.3d 110, 119-20 (2d Cir. 2010)(accord). “A pleading that offers 
‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not 
do.’” Ashcroft v. Iabal. 129 S.Ct. 1937,1949,173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 
U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955). “Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders ‘naked assertion[s]’ 
devoid o f ‘further factual enhancement.’” Id (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557, 127 S.Ct. 
1955). “Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level, 
on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact).” 
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 127 S.Ct. at 1959. The plausibility standard requires “more than a sheer 
possibility that defendant has acted unlawfully.” Iqbal. 129 S.Ct. at 1949.
In deciding a motion pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), the Court must liberally construe the 
claims, accept all factual allegations in the complaint as true, and draw all reasonable inferences 
in favor of the plaintiff. Matson v. Board of Education of City School District of New York, 631 
F.3d 57, 63 (2d Cir. 2011); Goldstein v. Pataki. 516 F.3d 50, 56 (2d Cir. 20081: see also Ruston 
v. Town Board for Town of Skaneateles. 610 F.3d 55, 59 (2d Cir. 20101. cert, denied. 131 S.Ct. 
824,178 L.Ed.2d 556 (2010) (“When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should 
assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to 
relief.”) However, this tenet “is inapplicable to legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals of the 
elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal. 
129 S.Ct. at 1949. “While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they 
must be supported by factual allegations.” Id at 1950; see also Ruston. 610 F.3d at 59 (“A court 
can choose to begin by identifying pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions, are
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not entitled to the assumption of truth.” (quotations and citations omitted)). Nonetheless, a 
plaintiff is not required to plead “specific evidence or extra facts beyond what is needed to make 
the claim plausible.” Arista Records. 604 F.3d at 120-1; see also Matson. 631 F.3d at 63 (“While 
a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, it requires more than an unadorned, the 
defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” (internal quotations and citation omitted)).
The Court must limit itself to the facts alleged in the complaint, which are accepted as 
true; to any documents attached to the complaint as exhibits or incorporated by reference therein; 
to matters of which judicial notice may be taken; or to documents upon the terms and effect of 
which the complaint “relies heavily” and which are, thus, rendered “integral” to the complaint. 
Chambers v. Time Warner. Inc.. 282 F.3d 147, 152-153 (2d Cir. 2002) (citing International 
Audiotext Network. Inc, v. American Tel, and Tel. Co.. 62 F.3d 69, 72 (2d Cir. 1995)); see also 
DiFolco v. MSNBC Cable LLC. 622 F.3d 104, 111 (2d Cir. 2010).
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2. Article II of the ADA7
The Library contends that since plaintiff seeks benefits to which she would only be 
entitled by virtue of her employment relationship with it, her exclusive remedy is under Title I, 
not Title II, of the ADA.
Plaintiffs claims against the Library are: (1) that it did not timely file an application for
7 For the reasons set forth above, plaintiff fails to satisfy the first element of a Title II ADA 
claim, insofar as she has not pled sufficient facts in her complaint plausibly suggesting that she is 
a “qualified individual with a disability.” However, since the Library assumes this element for 
purposes of its motion, and since it would be possible for plaintiff to amend her Title II claims to 
sufficiently plead this element as against the Library unless those claims would otherwise be 
futile, I will address the Library’s contention seeking dismissal of this claim on alternative 
grounds to determine whether any such amendment would be futile.
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disability retirement benefits under NYRSSL § 605(a)(2), which allows “[t]he head of the 
department in which [the applicant] is employed” to file an application on behalf of its employee; 
and (2) that it did not reclassify its termination of plaintiffs employment as a leave of absence, 
which would have allowed her additional time to file her application for disability retirement 
benefits under Section 605(b)(2)(c) of the NYRSSL. Thus, plaintiffs claims against the Library 
clearly relate to her employment with that entity, as opposed to the programs and services the 
Library offers to the public at large.
As noted above, one of the elements required to state a claim under Title II of the ADA is 
that the plaintiff was excluded from participation in, or was denied the benefits of, a public 
entity’s services, programs or activities, or was otherwise discriminated against by the public 
entity. See 42 U.S.C. § 12132; Henrietta D.. 331 F.3d at 272. There is no dispute that the 
Library is a “public entity” within the meaning of Title II. See 42 U.S.C. § 12131(1) (defining 
“public entity” to include “(A) any State or local government; [and] (B) any department, agency, 
special purpose district or other instrumentality of a State or States of local government * * *.”) 
However, courts are split over whether Title II of the ADA, entitled “Public Services,” may give 
rise to claims of employment discrimination by a public employer, or whether the exclusive 
remedy for such claims lies within Title I of the ADA.8 Compare Zimmerman v. Oregon 
Department of Justice. 170 F.3d 1169 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that Title II does not cover 
employment discrimination); Emmons v. City University of New York. 715 F.Supp.2d 394,408
8 Title I of the ADA, entitled “Employment,” provides, in relevant part, that “[n]o covered entity 
shall discriminate against a qualified individual on the basis of disability in regard to job 
application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee 
compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment.” 42 
U.S.C. § 12112(a).
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(E.D.N.Y. 2010) (holding that Title I of the ADA “is the exclusive remedy for employment 
discrimination claims, even if the employer is a public entity”); Fleming v. State University of 
New York. 502 F.Supp.2d 324, 333-34 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) (finding that the language of the ADA 
clearly and unambiguously devoted Title I exclusively to employment discrimination claims); 
Avantola v. Community Technical Colleges of State of Connecticut Board of Trustees. No. 
3:05CV957, 2007 WL 963178, at * 2 (D. Conn. Mar. 30, 2007) (holding that Title II of the ADA 
does not apply to employment actions, which must be brought trader Title I of that Act); with 
Bledsoe v. Palm Beach County Soil and Water Conservation District. 133 F.3d 816 (11th Cir. 
1998) (holding that Title II does cover employment discrimination); Transport Workers Union of 
America. Local 100. AFL-CIO v. New York City Transit Authority. 342 F.Supp.2d 160 
(S.D.N.Y. 2004) (accord); and Winokur v. Office of Court Administration. 190 F.Supp.2d 444, 
449 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (citing cases in this Circuit concluding that claims of employment 
discrimination are permitted under Title II).
To date, the Second Circuit has not expressly considered this issue, see Perrv v. State Ins. 
Fund, 83 Fed. Appx. 351, 354 n. 1 (2d Cir. Dec. 3, 2003) (declining to reach the issue of whether 
Title II of the ADA covers employment discrimination); Mullen v. Rieckhoff. 189 F.3d 461 
(1999) (unpublished opinion) (accord), although it has applied Title II of the ADA in 
employment discrimination actions where this issue was not raised, see, e^ g. Olson v. New York. 
315 Fed. Appx. 361 (2d Cir. Mar. 17, 2009); Castellano. 142 F.3d 58 (2d Cir. 1998), and it has 
interpreted Title ITs anti-discrimination provisions to be “a catch-all phrase that prohibits all 
discrimination by a public entity, regardless of the context * * Innovative Health System. Inc,
v. City of White Plains. 117 F.3d 37, 44-45 (2d Cir. 1997), overruled on other grounds by Zervos
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v. Verizon New York. Inc.. 252 F.3d 163, 171 n. 7 (2d Cir. 2001).
The Supreme Court also has not resolved this issue, although it has fairly recently used 
language implying that it would resolve the issue in favor of a finding that Title II does not cover 
employment discrimination. See Tennessee v. Lane. 541 U.S. 509, 516-7, 124 S.Ct. 1978,158 
L.Ed.2d 820 (2004) (The ADA “forbids discrimination against persons with disabilities in three 
major areas of public life: employment, which is covered by Title I * * *; public services, 
programs, and activities, which are the subject of Title II; and public accommodations, which are 
covered by Title III.”)9; PGA Tour. Inc, v. Martin. 532 U.S. 661, 675, 121 S.Ct. 1879, 149 
L.Ed.2d 904 (2001) (accord); Board of Trustees of University of Alabama v. Garrett. 531 U.S.
356, 360 n. 1 (2001) (“[N]o party has briefed the question of whether Title II of the ADA . . .  is 
available for claims of employment discrimination when Title I of the ADA expressly deals with 
that subject.” (citing Russello v. United States. 464 U.S. 16, 23, 104 S.Ct. 296, 78 L.Ed.2d 17 
(1983))).10
Based upon the well-reasoned decisions of the most recent district court cases in this 
Circuit, as well as the aforementioned language in the Supreme Court cases, I find that Title I of 
the ADA is the exclusive remedy for plaintiffs claims of discrimination against the Library, all 
of which relate to the “terms, conditions, and privileges of [her] employment” with that entity.
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ADA. See Henrietta D.. 331 F.3d at 272.
10 In Russello. the Supreme Court held that “where Congress includes particular language in one 
section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that 
Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.” 464 U.S. at 
23,104 S.Ct. 296. Thus, it may be inferred by the Supreme Court’s citation to Russello that it 
would deem Title II’s omission of any employment language, when such language is expressly 
included in Title I of the ADA, to have been a purposeful exclusion and not a “simple mistake in 
draftmanship.” Id.
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42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). Accordingly, plaintiffs Title II ADA claims against the Library (second 
and third causes of action) are dismissed with prejudice pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to 
state a claim.11
3. State Law Claims
Although the dismissal of state law claims is not required when the federal claims in an 
action are dismissed, see Wisconsin Dent, of Corrections v. Schacht. 524 U.S. 381, 391-92, 118 
S.Ct. 2047, 141 L.Ed.2d 364 (1998); Mauro v. Southern New England Telecommunications. Inc.. 
208 F.3d 384, 388 (2d Cir. 2000), a federal court may decline to exercise supplemental 
jurisdiction over the state law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). See Carlsbad 
Technology. Inc, v. HIF Bio. Inc.. 129 S.Ct. 1862, 1866-1867, 173 L.Ed.2d 843 (2009) (holding 
that a district court’s decision whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction after dismissing 
every claim over which it had original jurisdiction is purely discretionary). The court must 
“consider and weigh in each case, and at every stage of the litigation, the values of judicial 
economy, convenience, fairness, and comity in order to decide whether to exercise jurisdiction” 
over the pendent state law claims. Camegie-Mellon University v. Cohill. 484 U.S. 343, 350, n.
7, 108 S.Ct. 614, 98 L.Ed.2d 720 (1988); see also Kolari v. New York-Presbvterian Hospital. 455 
F.3d 118, 122 (2d Cir. 2006). Generally, where all of the federal claims in an action are 
dismissed before trial, the balance of factors will favor declining to exercise supplemental 
jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims. See Cohill. 484 U.S. at 350 n. 7, 108 S.Ct. 614;
11 Plaintiff does not seek leave to amend her complaint to assert a Title I ADA claim, nor refute 
the Library’s contention that she cannot state a valid Title I ADA claim because she failed to 
exhaust her administrative remedies with respect to any such claim as required by 42 U.S.C. § 
12117(a).
25
New York Mercantile Exchange. Inc, v. IntercontinentalExchanee. Inc.. 497 F.3d 109, 118-119 
(2d Cir. 2007); Kolari. 455 F.3d at 122.
In light of the dismissal of all federal claims in this action at the pleadings stage, and 
upon consideration of all relevant factors , i.e., judicial economy, convenience, fairness and 
comity, I decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiffs remaining pendant state 
law claims. Accordingly, plaintiffs state law claims against the Library (fourth and fifth causes 
of action) are dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). Plaintiff is advised that pursuant to 
28 U.S.C. § 1367(d), the statute of limitations for her state law claims, to the extent those claims 
were timely filed in this Court, is tolled for a period of thirty (30) days after the date of this 
order, unless a longer tolling period is otherwise provided under state law.
III. Conclusion
For the reasons stated herein, defendants’ respective motions to dismiss the complaint 
pursuant to Rule 12(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are granted to the extent set forth 
herein and the complaint is dismissed in its entirety. The Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment 
in favor of defendants and close this case.
SO ORDERED.
SANDRA J. FEUERSTEIN 
United States District Judge
Dated: May 5, 2011
Central Islip, N.Y.
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